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NO. 35 AUGUST 2019 Introduction 
Japan-South Korea Relations – 
A Downward Spiral 
More than “Just” Historical Issues 
Alexandra Sakaki 
The latest dispute between Japan and South Korea over compensation for former 
Korean forced labourers appears to be following a familiar pattern. Historical spats 
between two most important democracies in Northeast Asia – especially over the 
phase of Japanese colonial rule – are nothing new. But the tensions run deeper this 
time, and mutual mistrust has hit unseen heights. Japanese frustration has grown 
markedly, with Tokyo feeling duped by Seoul. While there have always been tussles 
over diverging interpretations of history, current domestic and regional develop-
ments are an exacerbating factor. Now leaders in both capitals are publicly ques-
tioning whether the other side still shares similar core values and strategic goals. 
The growing rift could easily affect the regional balance of power, weakening 
America’s position as ally of both Japan and South Korea. 
 
Japanese-South Korean relations are at their 
worst since normalisation in 1965. The 
relationship is so tense that Japanese Prime 
Minister Abe Shinzō refused bilateral talks 
with South Korean President Moon Jae-in 
at the G20 summit in Osaka at the end of 
June. Tokyo’s 1 July announcement of 
restrictions on exports of three chemicals 
to South Korea caused further consterna-
tion. Japan dominates the global market 
for these materials, which are required for 
manufacturing smartphone displays and 
semiconductors. Tokyo also decided on 
2 August to drop South Korea from the 
“whitelist” of countries it largely exempts 
from catch-all export controls for sensitive 
goods. Japan argues that it has evidence 
that South Korea had inadequately man-
aged sensitive supplied items used in arms 
production. Also, Tokyo said, there had 
been no bilateral talks on export controls 
since 2016. 
The true reason for the tightening of 
export controls, however, is likely to be 
the Japanese government’s ire over South 
Korea’s actions in the dispute over com-
pensation for former Korean forced labour-
ers. Tokyo wants to persuade Seoul to make 
concessions. In a declaration on the tight-
ening of export controls, Prime Minister 
Abe himself mentioned the issue of forced 
labourers: Because, he said, South Korea 
was failing to abide by international agree-
ments in its handling of this issue, Tokyo 
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had to assume that it was also breaking its 
promises concerning trade in sensitive 
goods. In response, Seoul announced that it 
would challenge Tokyo’s export controls 
before the WTO and remove Japan from its 
list of preferred trading partners. 
The bilateral relationship had already 
been characterised by tensions under the 
previous two South Korean governments 
(Park Geun-hye and Lee Myun-bak). For 
example the Park government held no 
summit with Tokyo for almost three years. 
Japanese and Korean experts and research-
ers are at a loss about how to stop the 
downward spiral. 
Disagreements between Japan and South 
Korea over their shared history are nothing 
new. The national identities of both count-
ries are coloured by explicit grievances, 
which hinder reconciliation. Japan is the 
central negative point of reference in 
modern South Korea’s self-image, and anti-
Japanese attitudes form an integral com-
ponent of South Korean nationalism. On 
the other side, Japanese right-wing nation-
alists in particular feel that their proud 
nation receives excessive criticism for its 
past, especially from Korea. 
The two countries have often argued 
about their history in the past. But in recent 
years the level of mistrust has reached pre-
viously unknown dimensions. Although 
these are the most important democracies 
in Northeast Asia and central allies of the 
United States, government officials and 
independent observers on both sides are 
increasingly voicing doubts that the respec-
tive other side is guided by similar values 
and strategic objectives. Current domestic 
and regional developments further burden 
the relationship. 
Escalating strife and mistrust 
The dispute between Japan and South Korea 
has been dominated by two issues in recent 
months: the question of compensation 
for former Korean forced labourers under 
Japanese colonial rule, and a military inci-
dent in December 2018. 
The conflict runs especially deep in 
relation to the question of compensation. 
The escalation was triggered by rulings by 
the Korean Supreme Court in October and 
November 2018, requiring the Japanese 
firms Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal and 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to make per-
sonal compensation payments to former 
forced labourers. Further cases against other 
Japanese firms are under way, affecting 
in all about one thousand former forced 
labourers. Tokyo asserts that an agreement 
on compensation was signed along with 
the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations, under 
which Japan provided $300 million in eco-
nomic aid and $200 million in reconstruc-
tion loans. In return South Korea regarded 
claims from the colonial period as settled. 
As far as the Japanese were concerned, the 
agreement covered both state and private 
claims. The issue of forced labourers had 
been explicitly discussed in the talks and 
until the 2018 court rulings Seoul had 
shared the line that the claims had been 
settled by the 1965 agreement. 
Now, in 2018, the South Korean supreme 
court argued that the 1965 Treaty on Basic 
Relations had only regulated state claims, 
not individual ones. This interpretation 
tallies with a trend in international law in 
recent decades to enhance individual legal 
protections and place greater weight on 
human rights. The Korean claimants are 
currently seeking to have assets of the re-
spective Japanese companies in South Korea 
seized to fund compensation payments. 
Japan has protested against this course of 
action and called on South Korea to agree 
to arbitration under the rules agreed in 
1965. But the Moon government has nei-
ther agreed to this proposal nor made any 
moves to stop the seizure of assets. 
From Tokyo’s perspective Seoul has 
broken with the 1965 treaty and is under-
mining the legal foundation of the bilateral 
relationship. Seoul responds that the rul-
ings affect the scope of the 1965 treaty, but 
do not fundamentally challenge its appli-
cability. South Korea appeals to Japan, as a 
democracy, to show respect for the inde-
pendence of its judiciary. Tokyo is consider-
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ing taking the dispute to the International 
Court of Justice; that, however, would 
however require Seoul’s consent – which 
Japanese and Korean researchers agree 
would be unlikely. Korean researchers and 
journalists point out that a lengthy inter-
national process would be unfair to the 
victims, who are already extremely old. 
Independent Japanese experts assert that 
South Korea would oppose involving the 
International Court of Justice because of 
the precedent that would create for Seoul’s 
territorial dispute with Tokyo over the 
Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo/Takeshima). 
Lacking alternative options, Japan has 
now chosen to tighten export controls. As 
such it has taken – like the United States, 
China and other countries – the inter-
nationally criticised route of using trade 
instruments to pursue diplomatic objec-
tives. While the criticisms may be justified, 
Tokyo’s actions also reveal how powerless 
it feels in the face of current South Korean 
policy. The move has been well received 
by the Japanese public, which certainly 
suited the Abe government in advance of 
the elections to the House of Councillors on 
21 July. It is however doubtful whether 
economic pressure will persuade Seoul to 
step back. It is more likely that South 
Korean public opinion will turn further 
against Japan and that the fronts will hard-
en on both sides. 
The two countries have also been em-
broiled in a second bitter dispute over a 
maritime incident that occurred on 20 De-
cember 2018 within Japan’s exclusive eco-
nomic zone. According to the Japanese, 
a South Korean warship undertaking a 
rescue operation for a North Korean vessel 
directed its fire-control radar at a Japanese 
patrol aircraft observing the manoeuvre. 
Seoul rejected the accusation and asserted 
that the Japanese plane had approached the 
South Korean vessel on a dangerous low-
altitude course. The defence ministries of 
both countries issued video footage to 
back their claims. 
While the question of blame cannot be 
clarified on the basis of public sources, the 
incident certainly underlines the extent of 
mutual mistrust. Instead of discussing the 
events at working level and – regardless of 
the question of fault – seeking means to 
prevent such incidents in future, Japanese 
and South Korean representatives accused 
each other of lying. Each side speculated 
about reasons why the other might have an 
interest in such an incident. South Korean 
journalists and researchers argued that the 
Abe government had provoked the incident 
in order to step up pressure on Seoul in the 
forced labourers dispute and to improve its 
public approval ratings. Japanese research-
ers in turn alleged that the South Korean 
vessel had not actually been conducting a 
rescue operation, but had in fact been in-
volved in illegal activities that it wished 
to keep concealed from the Japanese. For 
example, they asserted, Moon might have 
been seeking to supply funds to North 
Korea with the aim of improving relations. 
Social and domestic developments  
Current social and domestic tensions make 
it even more difficult for both sides to seek 
compromise in historical disputes. Recent 
years have witnessed a fundamental gener-
ational changeover in the political elites of 
both countries. Politicians born after the 
Second World War now define the agenda 
in Japan. Their attitude to the past is 
shaped much less by actual experience of 
the war and the immediate post-war era or 
by personal feelings of guilt. They expect 
South Korea to pursue a pragmatic line 
looking to the future rather than the past. 
Nationalist tendencies have also grown 
among Japanese politicians. Abe himself is 
a very controversial figure in South Korea, 
where he is seen as a revisionist who rela-
tivises Japanese colonial atrocities and 
wants to restore Japan’s former military 
strength. 
South Korean politics is increasingly 
influenced by the so-called “386 genera-
tion”, those who were born in the 1960s 
and participated in the student democracy 
movement in the 1980s. They have a very 
critical take on South Korea’s post-war 
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history and the dictatorship. Reassessing 
the events of that era – including the 
Treaty on Basic Relations with Japan – is 
one of their central concerns. This applies 
in particular to representatives of the pro-
gressive camp like President Moon, who 
was himself imprisoned in the 1980s for 
participating in a protest. So while South 
Korea has seen a growing desire to learn 
about and discuss the past, the new gener-
ation of Japanese elites tend to exhibit more 
strongly nationalist attitudes than their 
predecessors and focus more on the future. 
Domestically, South Korea continues to 
struggle with the aftermath of the scandal 
over the previous government under Park 
Geun-hye. Park, who was removed from 
office in March 2017 amidst corruption alle-
gation, was criticised for her lack of trans-
parency in governing. She tended to ignore 
advisers and cabinet ministers, and paid 
little heed to public opinion. Between 
October 2016 and March 2017 more than 
one million Koreans took to the streets in 
Seoul alone, in the so-called “Candle Light 
Protests”. Transparency in government was 
therefore a central promise of President 
Moon Jae-in, when he was elected in May 
2017. As the Five-Year Plan of the Moon Jae-
in Administration of August 2017 states, the 
new leadership intends to pursue “politics 
driven by the people, not a government 
for vested interests and elites”, rooting out 
“unfair privileges and foul play”. Broad 
public support is therefore vital, as Moon 
seeks to restore public confidence in 
politics.  
Park’s handling of history disputes with 
Japan also came in for criticism. Park had 
apparently influenced the judiciary and 
persuaded the then Chief Justice Yang 
Seung-tae to delay pronouncement of judge-
ment in the forced labourers cases in order 
to avoid diplomatic difficulties with Tokyo. 
By pointing to the independence of the 
courts and refusing to prevent the immi-
nent confiscation of Japanese assets, Presi-
dent Moon is taking a public stance against 
political influence on the judiciary. Over-
ruling the verdicts could trigger a constitu-
tional crisis. 
Park was also publicly criticised for the 
agreement her government reached with 
Japan in 2015 over the so-called “comfort 
women”, the women forced into prostitu-
tion in Japanese military camps during the 
Second World War. Tokyo had promised 
to contribute one billion yen (at the time 
equivalent to about €7.6 million) to a South 
Korean foundation for the victims, and the 
Japanese foreign minister had made an 
official apology for their suffering. Both 
sides had also agreed to end the dispute 
with “a final and irreversible resolution”. 
Although most of the surviving victims 
accepted payments from the foundation 
(namely 34 of the 46 women who were still 
alive), public dissatisfaction over the out-
come grew. A survey conducted in July 
2017 for the think-tanks Genron NPO and 
East Asia Institute found that about 56 per-
cent of South Koreans “disapprove” of the 
agreement. 75 percent also felt that the com-
fort women issue “has not been resolved”. 
Moon, who had called during his elec-
tion campaign for negotiations over the 
forced prostitution issue to be reopened, 
appointed a panel of experts to investigate 
the process by which the agreement had 
come into being. It reported its conclusions 
in December 2017: the Park government 
had conducted the negotiations in secret 
and without consulting the victims. Al-
though Moon decided to formally respect 
the “comfort women” agreement (for ex-
ample avoiding criticising Tokyo over the 
issue in multilateral forums), he dissolved 
the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation 
which was central to implementing the 
2015 agreement. In July 2018 the Moon 
government approved funds to replace 
the Japanese contributions with its own – 
although it remains unclear what is to 
happen with the Japanese money, as Tokyo 
does not wish to take it back. 
There are also other reasons for Moon’s 
tough line towards Japan. NGOs exert 
strong political influence in South Korea, 
first and foremost the so-called Korean 
Council (in full, the Korean Council for 
Justice and Remembrance for the Issues of 
Military Sexual Slavery by Japan). Founded 
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in 1990 to represent the interests of former 
“comfort women”, the Korean Council is 
regarded as a veto player on this issue. It is 
also reported to have mobilised the public 
protests against the 2015 agreement. In 
December 2011 the Korean Council erected 
a statue to “comfort women” in front of the 
Japanese embassy in Seoul. Tokyo regarded 
this as a violation of the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations, under which host 
countries are required to protect the dignity 
of diplomatic representations. In the inter-
im, the Korean Council has erected further 
statues, including some abroad. Since 2017 
other NGOs have also created similar monu-
ments to the forced labourers. In May 2018 
activists tried to erect a statue to the forced 
labourers in front of the Japanese consulate 
in Busan, but were prevented from doing 
so by a heavy police presence. 
Domestic calculations may also play a 
role in Moon’s anti-Japanese stance. South 
Korea’s traditional political division be-
tween liberal and conservative parties 
(known as the South-South divide, nam-nam 
kalteung) has deepened in recent years. De-
clining public support leaves Moon reliant 
on cooperation with the opposition for 
progress on important projects such as re-
forming the electoral system, and his North 
Korea agenda. A confrontational line to-
wards Japan helps the South Korean parties 
to close ranks and bridge their political 
differences. After meeting with five party 
leaders on 18 July, Moon announced that 
Seoul’s response to Japan’s tightening of 
export controls would be formulated in 
cross-party consultation. 
From Tokyo’s perspective, by dissolving 
the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation 
Moon has de facto suspended the “comfort 
women” arrangement – and violated an 
inter-governmental agreement. In recent 
years Japan had already seen growing criti-
cisms that South Korea had become a “bot-
tomless pit” for reconciliation gestures that 
would never be enough. That side of the 
debate felt vindicated by Moon’s policies. 
This also changes Japan’s domestic discourse 
on South Korea. Whereas right-wing nation-
alist views were once marginal, today anti-
Korean opinions find significant public 
resonance – going as far as to call for a 
“severance of relations” (dankō). 
Certain observers have expressed their 
hope that the Japanese-South Korean rela-
tionship will recover after Abe and Moon 
leave office. But it is unclear to what extent 
their successors will be willing to change 
tack. It is likely that the next South Korean 
president will again come from the pro-
gressive camp. The conservative parties, 
which traditionally place more importance 
on security cooperation with Japan, have 
been weakened by the scandal over Park 
Geun-hye. And anyway, they can hardly 
oppose the court rulings in the forced 
labour cases. On the Japanese side Prime 
Minister Abe has already taken a great 
domestic political risk with the “comfort 
women” agreement. After its failure, Japa-
nese researchers agree, no politician can 
afford to make any further concessions to 
South Korea. So the fronts have hardened 
on both sides. 
Strategic mistrust 
Diverging regional strategic perspectives 
further burden the bilateral relationship. 
In the past the shared interest in deterring 
North Korea was always an important and 
sufficient reason for security cooperation. 
But now Moon and Abe view each other’s 
dealings with North Korea with great mis-
trust. Improving relations with Pyongyang 
is a foreign policy priority for Moon, who 
met with North Korean ruler Kim Jong-un 
three times in 2018 alone. Abe on the other 
hand insists on a policy of strict sanctions 
against North Korea and observes South 
Korea’s overtures with great concern. Tokyo 
fears that Seoul could make concessions to 
Pyongyang that subvert Japanese security 
interests. Conversely, Seoul regards Tokyo’s 
hard line towards Pyongyang as a hindrance 
to its policy of rapprochement. The two 
countries’ white papers underscore just 
how widely their assessments diverge. 
While the Japanese white paper of August 
2018 describes the North Korean nuclear 
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and missile programme as an “unprece-
dentedly serious and imminent threat”, 
Seoul’s own white paper of January 2019 
dropped the designation of North Korea as 
an “enemy”. 
The two countries have also pursued 
diverging approaches in their dealings with 
China. Tensions in this area culminated 
during the Park Geun-hye administration, 
which sought to drive a wedge between 
North Korea and China by working to im-
prove its own relations with Beijing. Tokyo 
perceives the expansion of Chinese influ-
ence in the region as a threat and inter-
preted Seoul’s course as a turn towards 
Beijing. Japanese researchers and govern-
ment officials feared that Seoul might 
accept China as the leading regional power 
in place of the United States. Park in turn 
rejected Tokyo’s hard line as counter-
productive. China’s importance to Seoul 
extends well beyond its influence on North 
Korea, in particular as an economic partner. 
Bilateral trade with China offers South 
Korea enormous opportunities – but also 
creates dependencies and vulnerabilities. 
Japanese and South Korean perceptions 
concerning China have converged some-
what since 2017. Seoul has adopted a more 
critical stance towards Beijing since the 
Sino-Korean dispute over the deployment 
of American missile defence systems (Ter-
minal High Altitude Area Defence, THAAD) 
in South Korea in 2016/17. The Japanese 
perspective on China has improved a little, 
with both sides working to stabilise the 
relationship over the past three years. 
Nevertheless, Tokyo still worries that Seoul 
might accept Chinese regional dominance. 
So tensions could easily reignite over differ-
ent approaches to Beijing in Seoul and 
Tokyo. 
Changing economic dependencies 
Changing economic dependencies are 
another reason why historical disputes be-
tween Tokyo and Seoul escalate more 
intensely today. Half a century ago South 
Korea was still one of the world’s poorest 
countries. Now it is the twelfth-largest 
economy. As a developed economy with 
diversified trade relations, South Korea is 
nowhere near as dependent on Japanese 
investment and technology as it still was 
just two decades ago. Japan’s share of South 
Korea’s trade has been in steady decline 
since the mid-1970s. Between 1993 and 
2018 alone it fell from about 18 to 8 per-
cent. Since 2009 China’s share has in fact 
been larger than that of Japan and the 
United States together – reaching almost 
24 percent in 2018. And almost one quarter 
of South Korea’s foreign direct investment 
goes to China, against just 2 percent to 
Japan. So Japan’s relative importance 
to South Korea has fallen, while China has 
become the most important economic 
partner. 
Nevertheless, there are still areas where 
South Korea remains highly dependent on 
Japan – one case in point being the three 
chemical products mentioned above, which 
are now subject to stricter export controls. 
South Korea also imports crucial techno-
logical components from Japan, as well as 
plant and machinery. 
In view of its impressive economic rise 
and growing confidence, it is unsurprising 
if Seoul pursues its historical demands on 
Tokyo more determinedly than in the past. 
On the other hand, South Korea’s economic 
success engenders different expectations 
among the Japanese political elites: Japan 
and South Korea, they argue, can now treat 
each other as equals and Tokyo no longer 
needs to make continuous concessions to 
Seoul’s demands. In South Korea this stance 
is regarded as confirmation that revisionist 
tendencies are proliferating in Japan. 
Outlook: An Ill Wind …  
The downward spiral in Japanese-South 
Korean relations will be hard to reverse. 
The fronts have hardened. Domestic pres-
sures compel politicians on both sides to 
respond forcefully to actions by the respec-
tive other that are perceived as offensive, 
which further exacerbates tensions. There 
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is scant willingness to negotiate compro-
mises, for fear of public criticism. 
The relationship is so tense and mistrust-
ful that the two sides have ceased to recog-
nise each other as partners with shared 
values. In 2015 Japan’s Diplomatic Blue-
book dropped its reference to sharing “fun-
damental values such as freedom, democ-
racy, and respect for basic human rights” 
with South Korea. South Korea’s 2018 white 
paper likewise dropped the passage refer-
ring to the shared values with Japan. 
The dispute between Japan and South 
Korea also gives grounds for European con-
cern. Such a gulf of mistrust between East 
Asia’s two most important democracies can 
easily be exploited – especially by China, 
to expand its own power in the region and 
weaken US influence. Unlike in the past, 
Washington has largely watched the dete-
rioration of relations between its two most 
important allies in Asia without under-
taking efforts at mediation. That may be 
changing: during his visit to Tokyo and 
Seoul in the first half of August US Defence 
Secretary Mark Esper urged both sides to 
cooperate on the North Korean threat. 
Even changes in political leadership are 
initially unlikely to bring about lasting 
improvements in relations. While Europe 
possesses little in the way of real influence, 
it should make it clear that a better Japa-
nese-South Korean relationship is also in 
its interest. The idea of allowing the joint 
agreement on exchange of military intel-
ligence on North Korea to expire is current-
ly under discussion in South Korea. But 
both sides have a real interest in security 
cooperation in relation to North Korea, 
which should not be allowed to become a 
political football. 
President Moon’s August 15 speech on 
the 74th anniversary of Japan’s surrender 
in the Second World War offered a glimmer 
of hope for bilateral relations. Striking a 
conciliatory note, he stated his hope for 
Tokyo and Seoul to cooperate in mending 
their ties. 
In order to prevent China exploiting the 
bilateral dispute to weaken US influence 
in Asia, Tokyo and Seoul should now resist 
nationalist urges and work to calm the 
situation. Japan must accept that recon-
ciliation is always an ongoing process, espe-
cially in relation to a young democracy like 
South Korea which has a heightened need 
to come to terms with its own history. 
For its part, South Korea must realise that 
reconciliation requires the victims’ side to 
accept positive gestures, and that relitigat-
ing these after they have been accepted will 
only strengthen the nationalist forces on 
the other side. 
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